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THE CENTURY OF THE BRAVE & STOLJEĆE HRABRIH

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ROMAN CONQUEST AND INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE IN ILLYRICUM DURING THE TIME OF AUGUSTUS AND HIS HEIRS

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD IN ZAGREB 22-26.9.2014.

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Kip cara Augusta iz Nina (*Aenona*), Arheološki muzej u Zadru, fotografirao Ivo Pervan
Statue of the emperor Augustus from Nin (*Aenona*), Archaeological museum in Zadar, photo by Ivo Pervan

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OCTAVIAN'S ILLYRIAN WAR: AMBITION AND STRATEGY

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The aims of Octavian's Illyrian War are disputed; however, exercising the army cannot be taken as a general motive for the war. The campaigns extended over a large area, hence they cannot be regarded merely as military manoeuvres, without strategically detailed plans. The latter must have existed, since the theatre of the war itself demanded them. The highlights were the conquests of Metulum and Segesta/Siscia, as well as Promona, Sinotium, and Setovia. At the symbolic level, the defeat of the Delmatae and recapture of legionary standards were one of the greatest achievements of the war, aptly exploited by Octavian in terms of political propaganda against Antony. During the war, Octavian acquired fame as a successful general; emulating Caesar and Alexander the Great, he planned both a war against the Dacians, and also an eastern campaign against the Parthians. However, the sidus Iulium on some of his coins symbolized the deification of Caesar, and hence Octavian's divine origin. It cannot be taken as Alexander's star and explained in terms of Octavian's emulation of Alexander.

Keywords: *Octavian/Augustus, Illyricum, emulation of Caesar and Alexander the Great*

AN OUTLINE OF THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE WAR

After Caesar's death and several years of struggle for supremacy, the Triumvirate was established, but since Lepidus soon lost all power, Marc Antony and Octavian (the future emperor Augustus) remained the only rivals striving to attain absolute dominion. According to the pact of Brundisium in 40 BC, they divided the Roman Empire along a line running through Scodra (Shkodër) in southern Illyricum. Although this did not correspond to the boundary between Illyricum (at that time still a military *provincia*) and Macedonia, it may nonetheless be claimed that Octavian was assigned almost the entirety of Illyricum. However, Antony possessed Lissus, Apollonia, and Dyrrhachium, vital harbours for transferring troops from Italy to the East, which also served as military supply bases. And indeed, the control of these harbours would be of great strategic importance for any future conflict between the two triumvirs. It is therefore not surprising that in the course of his Illyrian War (35–33 BC) Octavian gained possession of some of this area deliberately, as is confirmed by his conquest of the Taulantii, an Illyrian people, who undoubtedly inhabited regions outside his dominion (Mirković 1968).

Octavian's Illyrian War, which was decisive for the systematic conquest of Illyricum, is described in detail by Appian. His *Illyrike* is based on Augustus' *Commentarii* and can therefore be regarded as biased, but the wealth of details makes it an excellent source. Several dozens of peoples and tribes involved in this war were noted by name by Appian. The account of Cassius Dio is by far less exhaustive and has a certain importance only for the first phase of the war against the Iapodes and Pannonians. Additional data are contained as short notes in several other writers, from Strabo to Orosius.[1] Simi-

[1] Strabo (4.6.10; 7.5.2–5), Livy (*per.* 131–132), Velleius Paterculus (2.78.2), Florus (2.23), Suetonius (*Aug.* 20), and Orosius (*Hist.* 6.19.3).

larities in Appian's and Dio's accounts indicate that Dio, too, used the *Commentarii* of Augustus as a source, but he did it selectively and also used other historians. Additionally, he had personal knowledge of both Dalmatia and Pannonia, since he had governed these provinces. It is not clear what other historical narratives he may have used, possibly Asinius Pollio and/or Cremutius Cordus.

Octavian subdued several peoples and tribes, most of which are known by name, but only some of them were dangerous enemies whose conquest demanded greater efforts. Summing up the war at the beginning of the 17th chapter of his *Illyrian History*, Appian stated that "*the greatest difficulties were caused to Octavian's army by the Salassi, the Iapodes on the other side of the Alps, and the Segestani, and further the Dalmatae, the Daesii and the Paeones* (i.e. Pannonians)*, who live far away from the Salassi*". The military campaign against the Salassi, who controlled the Little and Great St Bernard passes, and hence the routes to Helvetia and the Upper Rhine region, was conducted far outside Illyricum, but was obviously planned at the same time as the Illyrian War. Dio's account also makes it clear that the war in Illyricum was mainly directed against the Iapodes, some of the Pannonians (mainly the Segestani), and the Delmatae (*fig. 1*).

THE FALL OF METULUM AND SEGESTA/SISCIA

This war was divided into two phases, both in terms of space and time. After having defeated the Carni and Taurisci – obviously from the military base at Aquileia – Octavian's army proceeded towards the Segestani and their centre at Segestica/Siscia. At the same time, some of the Roman troops were probably transported by ships to Senia and marched from there against the Iapodes. This is not explicitly mentioned in the sources, but could be inferred from Appian, who wrote that Octavian had fought not only against the pirates based on the islands of Melita and Black Corcyra in the southern Adriatic, but also against the Liburnian pirates in the north. While Octavian exterminated the former, he only confiscated ships from the Liburni (*Illyr.* 16.47), which indicates, on the one hand, that the Liburni were more cooperative than hostile (Čače 1993: 32–34), and on the other, that he needed the boats for his war, no doubt both for the transfer of troops and logistics. In any case, the Roman navy played a quite significant role in the Illyrian War; military ships sailed from the naval bases at Ravenna (against the Liburni), as well as from Brundisium (against the southern Adriatic islands; Šašel Kos 2012).

Octavian's army then marched against the Iapodes in the Alps, i.e. the Moentini and the Avendeatae, who surrendered immediately, as well as against the most numerous and most bellicose among them, the Arupini. However, the greatest resistance was offered by the transalpine Iapodes; Octavian took Terponus, but most of the Iapodes gathered in their fortified capital of Metulum. In several fierce battles the Metulans even "*fired from the wall upon the soldiers with military devices, seized in the war which had been fought there by Decimus Brutus against Antony and Augustus*" (*Illyr.* 19.54; Šašel Kos 2005, 430–432). Octavian was seriously wounded during the siege, but eventually Metulum fell (Olujić 2003; Id. 2007: 92–102). The Iapodes were undoubtedly one of the most dangerous enemies of Octavian in this war, second only to the Delmatae. Both had great experience in fighting the Romans.

The next episode described by Appian was the capture of Segesta/Siscia in the region of the Segestani, the well-known *emporium* at the confluence of the Sava and Kupa Rivers, called Segestica by Strabo (4.6.10 C. 207). In his parallel description of the fall of Segesta, Cassius Dio, preferring the contemporary denomination, always calls the town Siscia, an ancient name, which eventually prevailed over the adjacent settlement Segesta (Šašel 1974: 704–705 [1992: 601–602]; Buzov 1996; Radman-Livaja 2007; Id. 2010), giving name to the later Flavian colony (Lolić 2003). Appian mentioned that Octavian advanced against the Segestani "*through the country of the Paeones* (meaning the Pannonians)*, which was also not under Roman authority at that time*". The historian added that the region was wooded, extending from the Iapodes to the Dardanians, and that the Pannonians did not live in cities, but in villages. There were 100,000 men capable of fighting but because of the absence of a common government and a military leader they also had no unified and well-organized army (*Illyr.* 22.62–63). The Pannonian region, which was traversed by Octavian's soldiers on their way to Segesta, was most probably that of the Colapiani (formerly perhaps under Iapodian dominion) and the Oseriates, as well as other tribes not known by name. In any case, these must have been some of the socially least developed peoples of the future province of Pannonia, but nonetheless – as Appian claimed at the beginning of his account – they had fought fiercely before they were overcome.

Fig. 1: Octavian's campaigns: documented and hypothetical routes (from Šašel Kos 2005: 423 fig. 99).

Octavian wanted to occupy Segesta/Siscia to use it as a supply base for his planned war against the Dacians and the Bastarnae; Strabo, too, mentioned that the town was an excellent starting point for the war against the Dacians (7.5.2 C. 313). Segesta's strategic position was indeed excellent. There is hardly any doubt that Octavian had diplomatic contacts with the Dacians, which can be inferred from strange rumors that he offered their King Cotiso his daughter Julia in marriage, or was even himself prepared to marry Cotiso's daughter (Suet., *Aug.* 63.4). This should be ascribed to the negative propaganda of Octavian's adversaries (Condurachi 1995), although there must have been some truth in an alliance of Octavian with Cotiso at that time, as is indirectly confirmed by Antony's contacts with Dicomes, another of Burebistas' successors (Plut., *Ant.* 63.7; cf. Dio, 51.22.8; cf. Danov 1979: 122–123). It is not clear, however, who was the first to seek contacts with the Dacians, Octavian or Antony. Appian reported that in the course of conquering Segesta, Octavian ordered ships to be built on the Sava River for transporting provisions to the Danube and the regions of the Dacians. It is strange, however, that he did not make any mention of the river battle at Segesta, which is briefly described by Dio (49.37). In one of the two rivers running by the settlement, either the Colapis (Kupa) or the Savus, Octavian's naval general Menodorus, a freedman of Pompey the Great and the former navy commander of Sextus Pompeius, lost his life (Šašel Kos 1997).

After the fall of Segesta, Octavian left a garrison of twenty-five cohorts in the town under the command of Fufius Geminus; Geminus quelled a revolt of the Segestani, which broke out after Octavian's departure. Interestingly, Fufius Geminus

is not mentioned in Appian's detailed narrative, but only in the rather short description by Dio of the Illyrian War.

THE DELMATAE

In the spring of 34 BC, the Roman army was directed against the most formidable enemy in the future province of Dalmatia, the Delmatae, as well as against some less prominent peoples living along the coast or in the immediate hinterland. The Delmatae had more than 12,000 men capable of fighting, under the united command of Versus, partly no doubt the result of more than a century of warfare with the Romans. The Dalmatian phase of the Illyrian War is described by Appian in the four subsequent chapters of his *Illyrian History* (25–28), while Dio devoted only two sentences to it (49.38.3–4). He mentioned that the Delmatae were first battled by Agrippa and then by Caesar (= Octavian); several cruel measures had to be taken against them before their final defeat. Octavian was again wounded, some soldiers were punished by receiving oats instead of grain, while the deserters were decimated. As is known from Appian, Octavian was wounded in a fight at Setovia (27.79).[2]

Appian's description is more exhaustive, and he described the capture of Promona in considerable detail. This was the first stronghold that could have been successfully defended to protect the Delmataean territories and was therefore vitally important for the Delmatae. The fortress had been disputed between them and the Liburni (Appian twice called it Liburnian), and was recaptured from the latter by the Delmataean general Versus with an army of 12,000 warriors (*Illyr.* 12.34; 25.72; Bilić-Dujmušić 2006). The indigenous names attested in funerary inscriptions around Promona may indicate that the town would have originally been Delmataean (Čače 1989: 87; cf. Starac 2000: 13–14), and indeed it was situated on the Delmataean side of the Titius River (Krka). Appian then recounted the capture of Sinotium (most probably Balina Glavica; Bilić-Dujmušić 2013: 470), where the army of Aulus Gabinius had been ambushed and defeated during the time of Caesar, with five cohorts annihilated by the Delmatae, who seized the legionary standards (Bilić-Dujmušić 2001 [unpublished]: 181–205). Octavian recaptured them, aptly using his exploit in terms of political propaganda against Antony; at the symbolic level, this was no doubt one of the greatest achievements of his Illyrian War. The siege of Setovia followed, where Octavian was wounded in the knee by a stone from a slingshot and had to recuperate for several days. The siege was successfully ended in 33 BC by one of Octavian's best generals, T. Statilius Taurus. The surrender of the Derbani is the last action reported by Appian to have taken place in the course of the Illyrian War (on which exhaustively Šašel Kos 2005, 393 ff.). It is known from Cassius Dio that the province of Illyricum was organized as senatorial in 27 BC (53.12.4–7),[3] and Cn. Baebius Tamphilus Vála Numonianus, whose inscription was discovered on one of the sides of the fountain in the forum at Iader, and who may have been the person who ordered the construction of the Iader forum and was perhaps the patron of the town, was one of the first proconsuls in Illyricum (Fadić 1986 [= *AE* 1986, 547]; Fadić 1999 [= *AE* 2000, 1181]; Dzino 2008).

MOTIVES FOR THE WAR AND THE DISPUTED EXTENT OF THE CONQUERED AREA

As is clear from the existing accounts of Greek and Roman historians, as well as from archaeological data, there was no systematic conquest of Illyricum up to Octavian and even his strategic planning, goals, and aspirations are disputed (discussed by Šašel Kos 2005 and Dzino 2010, in several chapters). Appian and Dio mention reasons for Octavian's war, which in the eyes of the Romans fully justified it as *bellum iustum* (Dzino 2010: 103). According to Dio, the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni, and Iapodes ceased to pay tributes and often invaded the neighbouring territories, which resulted in an open rebellion upon the news of Octavian's absence (49.34.2); he left for Sicily, intending to sail to Africa (49.34.1). He probably wished to avoid any joint action with Antony in a campaign against the Illyrians,

[2] Setovia's location is not certain; Šušanj near Sinj (Osinium) has been proposed by Gunjača 1937: 37 (cf. Milošević 1998: no. 311), Sinj by Veith 1914: 98–104; 111–112, and Periša 2008: 512.

[3] Illyricum is called the Delmatian region by Dio (*tò Delmatikón*). The change occurred when Augustus began to reorganize the Roman state; on his reign in general, see Kienast 1999 (2009).

which was announced in the autumn of 36 BC (App., *Bell. civ.* 5.128.530), and in which Antony wished to participate (*ibid*. 5.132.549). Octavian thus wanted to gain time during which Antony would lose interest in Illyricum.

Appian referred to Octavian's achievements after the war with the following words: "*Augustus, however, took everything entirely in his own hands and stated in the Senate that he had — in contrast to Antony's inactivity — succeeded in saving Italy from the barely conquerable peoples who had so often attacked it*" (*Illyr*. 16.46). Octavian's propaganda against Antony is clearly in the foreground. Walter Schmitthenner in his fundamental study of Octavian's wars in Illyricum claimed that only those reasons and motives for the war, which are mentioned in the ancient sources, mainly Appian and Cassius Dio, should be regarded as valid. Any ulterior motives behind the wars, assumed by some modern interpreters, should be viewed with great caution (Schmitthenner 1958: 190–200). The defence of Italy certainly contributed much to consolidate Octavian's political position in Rome, and this has never been doubted (Meier 1990: 67; Kienast 1999 (2009): 59–60). However, it could also be a matter of dispute to what extent some of the recorded reasons for his war have been overemphasized and preferred as opposed to others.

Thus Schmitthenner himself made too much of a side aspect of the campaign, mentioned by Dio, which he applied to the entire Illyrian War. After his description of the fall of Metulum, Dio claimed that the Pannonians (meaning the Segestani) had given Octavian no reason to invade them; Octavian merely wanted to maintain his army at the cost of a foreign country and exercise it outside Italy (49.36.1). That this could have been an important reason for the Illyrian War in general is seemingly confirmed by the data in Velleius Paterculus, according to which Octavian had already begun to train his army in Illyricum and Dalmatia in 39 BC: "*In the meanwhile Caesar (= Octavian) – in order that his soldiers would not be corrupted by idleness – frequently sent them on expeditions in Illyricum and Delmatia, thereby hardening his army by endurance of danger and war experience.*" (2.78.2).[4] However, the political and military situation in 39 BC was much different from that of 35 BC. Exercising the army cannot be taken as a general motive for the Illyrian War; such a view is not confirmed by the existing ancient accounts and is misleading, since Dio's statement only refers to one single episode in this war and not to other peoples involved in the war. The fact that this is not mentioned in Appian's account of the fall of Segesta/Siscia, only means that he did not find it in Augustus' *Commentarii*.

Schmitthenner explained Octavian's war as military manoeuvres, during which a large military force was deliberately employed without a precise idea of their duration in time and extent of the conquests. Both would depend on the political situation of the moment (Schmitthenner 1958: 190–200). Military-strategic reasons would have been in the background and consequently he regarded Mommsen's explanation of Octavian's war as wrong. In Mommsen's opinion the Illyrian War was the first phase of great offensive plans to extend the northern and northeastern frontiers of the Roman state as far as the Rhine and the Danube (Mommsen 1886: 7–10 [English translation ed. by Broughton: 8–10]; also Kromayer 1898: 1 ff.; Rice Holmes 1928: 130–135; cf. Syme 1956: 240). Schmitthenner also disagreed with hypotheses that ascribed to Octavian's actions certain indirect motives such as securing the Sava River valley to prevent Antony from advancing from the East to Italy along this route (Swoboda 1932:15–17; 44–47), or fortifying southern Illyricum for a possible future encounter with Antony from that direction (Patsch 1932: 55–56; 65–66; Mirković 1968). But actually neither of these hypotheses should be discarded as implausible.

Octavian's campaigns extended over a rather large area, hence they cannot be regarded merely as military manoeuvres, without systematic and strategically detailed plans (Schmitthenner 1958). These must have existed, since the theatre of the war itself demanded them (on the complex debate concerning the "anti-strategy school", see Wheeler 2011: 194–196, with relevant references). It has recently been demonstrated how most unsuitable for any warfare were the regions of the Delmatae, who were one of the main enemies of Octavian. Just before the Illyrian War they were at the peak of their political and military power, representing a serious threat equally to the Liburni, backed by the Romans, and to the Romans themselves. In addition, they still held the legionary standards taken from the fatally defeated army of Gabinius. The area inhabited by the Delmatae could

[4] *Interim Caesar per haec tempora, ne res disciplinae inimicissima, otium, corrumperet militem, crebris in Illyrico Delmatiaque expeditionibus patientia periculorum bellique experientia durabat exercitum* (the chronology is clear from the context).

only be penetrated via three corridors, defined as Liburnian, Salonitan, and Naronitan, and could be mastered mainly by "scorched earth" tactics (Bilić-Dujmušić 2013). Such a terrain necessarily demanded some previous knowledge of the geography and carefully planned attacks and offensives. Octavian's war was fought with the intention of conquering new territories and consolidating the area called Illyricum, which in the time of Caesar had still been a military province, comprising regions that were disconnected. That the war was indeed planned on a large scale is also indicated by the campaign against the Salassi, who inhabited Alpine regions outside Illyricum ('Illyrian' Salassi have been erroneously suggested by Carcopino 1946: 96–117, and Biffi 1995).

On the other hand, however, the extent of the conquered territories should not be exaggerated, as had been done by some modern interpreters in the first half of the 20th century, thus notably by Erich Swoboda (1932) and Nikola Vulić (1903: 489–500), who erroneously concluded that Octavian subdued much of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina.[5] Clearly, several powerful Pannonian peoples were not directly attacked at that time, and Georg Veith's analysis of Octavian's achievements is still to a large extent valid. Appian, who based his narrative on Augustus' *Commentarii*, noted thirty peoples involved in the Illyrian War, but mentioned no peoples from the interior of the later provinces of Pannonia and Dalmatia. Only Appian's Daesii (*Daisioi*: *Illyr.* 17.49) have not yet been satisfactorily explained, mainly because it is uncertain whether the name should be regarded as corrupted or not. If corrupted, it could perhaps stand for the Daesitiates, one of the most powerful peoples in the interior of Illyricum (Mesihović 2011: *passim*); this was proposed by Johann Schweighäuser in his 1785 edition of Appian. If indeed the Daesitiates were involved in one way or another in that war, it could only be assumed that Octavian would have established diplomatic relationships with them. However, it is also possible that the Daesii were one of several unidentified peoples in the interior of the future Pannonia. In any case, Appian's account makes it evident that the interior of the Balkans had not been conquered at the time, and those conclusions of Vulić and Swoboda that referred to the extent of the conquests, were soon afterwards disputed by Syme, and later by Schmitthenner, Mócsy, Wilkes, Gruen, and several others.

However, the justified censure of early opinions, which had exaggerated Octavian's conquests, sometimes resulted in excessively diminishing his military achievements in Illyricum. This still prevalent opinion is perhaps due to the remarks of Ronald Syme, who said that "we know more than we really need to" about some aspects of Octavian's campaigns in Illyricum (Syme 1934: 76 [1991: 1]). Thus a statement that "the actual accomplishments in the Illyrian War of 35 to 33 B.C. were modest" (Gruen 1996: 173; Kienast 1999 (2009): 350–351, citing Syme and Schmitthenner; Southern 2001 [2014²], 88–90; Richardson 2012, 63–65), should be partly reconsidered and viewed in the broader context of military achievements before and after Octavian. As is sufficiently clear from the combined sources, but particularly from Appian, the results of the Illyrian War were the conquest of the Iapodes, of the Pannonian territory as far as Siscia, of the Delmatae, and of most of the coastal regions with some of the hinterland. Highlights were the conquests of Metulum, of the important *emporium* of Segesta/Siscia, as well as of Promona, Sinotium, and Setovia.

CAESAR'S LEGACY AND EMULATION OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

Octavian, who was adopted by Caesar in his will, had been sent by him a year earlier to Apollonia to study in a local military school, in order to gain experience in martial matters and accompany him on his planned military expeditions (App., *Bell. civ.* 3.9.30–32). Octavian must have known the southeastern coast of the Adriatic well. After Caesar's murder he accepted his legacy, which was not at all easy at the time, since Antony, one of Caesar's best generals, also regarded himself, at least in this respect, as his worthy successor. Octavian's alliances at the beginning of his military career were indeed peculiar and astonishing, at Mutina in 43 BC, for example, he even fought, together with both consuls, Vibius Pansa and Aulus Hirtius, against Antony on the side of Decimus Iunius Brutus, one of Caesar's murderers (Matijević 2006: 100). Nonetheless, the situation was understandable in view of his animosity towards Antony. The

[5] Criticized by Syme 1933 (1971); cf. also Josifović 1956. Opinions *pro* and *contra* are cited by Schmitthenner 1958; cf. Nagy 1991; Syme 1937 (1971); Gruen 1996: 171–174; Wilkes 1969: 50–57; Wilkes 1996: 545–550; Šašel Kos 1999, with earlier literature.

Triumvirate was not much more than an emergency exit for Octavian, and the pact of Brundisium between Antony and himself in 40 BC was regarded by him as a temporary state of affairs. The most decisive event that paved his way to autocracy was the defeat of Sextus Pompeius at Naulochus in 36 BC, which even echoed in Illyricum. At Tasovčići in the region of Narona, the Papii brothers, probably merchants, erected on this occasion a memorial to *Imp(erator) Caesar Divi f(ilius)*, i.e. Octavian (*fig. 2*).[6] They and no doubt several others, who probably collaborated with the Roman headquarters – a possible indication of the Roman strategy in the area – must have supported the Roman expansion along the eastern Adriatic coast.

In the process of attaining supremacy, the Illyrian War enabled Octavian to proclaim himself the liberator of Italy, particularly by contrasting his actions with those of Antony in the East, but most of all to gain a military reputation, so important for the heir of Caesar. In the course of this war, he specifically stressed the fact that he wanted to carry out Caesar's plan to attack the Dacians. He also intended to invade Britain, another of Caesar's unfulfilled plans, which he purposely emphasized. The Dacians and Bastarnae were mentioned by Appian (*Illyr.* 22.65), and Britain by Dio (49.38.2). The Dacians, however, were particularly relevant (Strabo, 7.3.5 C. 298; Livy, *Per.* 117; Suet., *Caes.* 44; *Aug.* 8), since not long before, their king Burebistas had directly threatened the safety of Italy (Strabo, 7.3.11 C. 304; Suet., *Caes.* 44; App., *Bell. civ.* 2.110). In terms of the current political and military situation, it was of great significance for Octavian to insist on being Caesar's heir; in contrast, when his position had been consolidated and his supremacy was universally acknowledged, the figure of the dictator was no longer important to him, which seems to be mirrored in the texts of contemporary writers, where Caesar's image is not at all exalted (Yavetz 1990: 34; Donié 1996). This was partly also related to the fact that Augustus built his authority, slowly but consistently, within the frame of the Republic that he restored, and which had proven to have been incompatible with the aspirations and actions of Caesar (Meier 1990).

However, at the time of his Illyrian War, it was essential for Octavian to acquire fame as a successful general.



Fig. 2: The brothers C. Papius Celsus and M. Papius Kanus commemorated Octavian's victory at Naulochus over Sextus Pompey in 36 BC (ILS 8893 = HD044645)

During the siege of Metulum, Octavian personally participated in one of the assaults on the town ramparts and was wounded. The attacks from both the Roman and Iapodian sides were fierce; the Romans erected four bridges to reach the top of the wall (Veith 1914: 29–50). Appian described the episode with vivid words (*Illyr*. 20.56–58): "*When yet a third* [bridge] *collapsed, the Romans were panic-stricken, and none even attempted to step on the fourth until Caesar leaped down from the tower and sharply reproached them for cowardice. When even that did not spur them, he himself took his shield and dashed onto the bridge at a run.* **57** *His two commanders, Agrippa and Hiero, ran with him, as well as his bodyguard Lutus, and Volas; only these four and a few personal guards. He had already almost crossed the bridge, when the humiliated soldiers rushed in great numbers after him, and again the bridge collapsed under the weight, burying many men under it. Some of them lost their lives, while others were carried off with broken bones.* **58** *Caesar had been wounded in the right leg and both arms. Despite this, he climbed the tower with his insignia and showed himself to be alive and well, so that there would be no unrest due to rumours that he was dead*". The name Hiero is corrupted, he may have been Tiberius' father Ti. Claudius Nero.[7] This episode is the only one mentioned by Florus in

[6] *CIL* III 14625 = *ILS* 8893 = *HD*0044645: *Imp(eratori) Caesari Divi f(ili) / Sicilia recepta. C. Papius Celsu[s] / M. Papius Kanus, fratres.*

[7] Suggested already by J. Schweighäuser in his 1785 edition of Appian, p. 856; Münzer 1899; Broughton 1952: 408; Fitz 1993: 27; Ti. Claudius Nero supposedly died in 33 BC.

his very short account of the Illyrian War; however, he did not even mention Metulum, but only Octavian's wounds (2.23; cf. also Suet., *Aug*. 20.2).

Octavian's achievements in the Illyrian War legitimized him to promote his image as a victorious military commander, who could match his reputation with that of Caesar. This was additionally significant for Octavian because he strove to surpass Antony at all levels (Schmitthenner 1958: 191–195; 225–226; Dobiáš 1929: 287; Id. 1921; Gruen 1990: 401; Id. 1996: 172). Indeed, it is known from the sources that Octavian emulated not only Caesar but also Alexander the Great, as did Pompey, Caesar, and Antony in their turn (Michel 1967). It should not be forgotten that Cicero at the very beginning of 43 BC, on the eve of Mutina, when proposing that Octavian be given the rank of *propraetor*, compared him with Alexander the Great, stressing that young age was no obstacle to great deeds (*Phil*. 5.17.48). Emulation of Alexander the Great must have appealed to all successful generals in antiquity and should therefore be regarded as expected. The complex personality of Alexander gave room for great men of the most varied characters, even direct antagonists, to identify themselves with him in certain situations. Caesar not only planned a war against the Dacians, but also an eastern campaign against the Parthians (Suet., *Iul*. 44.3). While Antony appropriated to himself Alexander's image of the oriental despot, Octavian emulated Alexander's bravery in battles, and even more so his great project to be a master of the *oecumene*, as did Caesar (Coppola 1999; Rampado 2013: 1157). On the cameo in the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna, Octavian/Augustus was depicted as Alexander-Zeus (Zwierlein-Diehl 2008: 78–83 no. 3). Octavian had a *denarius* minted, probably at Brundisium between 29 and 27 BC, with the head of Mars and 'Imp' on the obverse and a shield with a star (eight-rayed, with a circle in the middle) lying on a crossed spear and sword, with the legend 'Caesar' on the reverse (*RIC* 274; *fig. 3*). However, the chronology of these coins (*Imp Caesar* and *Caesar Divi f*) is not entirely clear, they may have been minted to pay the soldiers who had served during the Actium campaign, or earlier, after the battle at Naulochus.[8] It has been proposed that the star was the Macedonian star; in this case the coin would illuminate not only Octavian's ambition to be the heir of Caesar, worthy of his reputation, but would also allude to Alexander the Great (Rampado 2013). However, the star cannot be other but the *sidus Iulium*, no different from the star on the *RIC* 250, symbolizing the deification of Julius Caesar, and hence emphasizing Octavian's divine origin.[9]

Another important aspect was Octavian's personal bravery, intended to match that of Alexander. Although certain characteristics of different sieges in antiquity inevitably appear similar, it has been hypothesized that some details of the capture of Metulum may have resembled the assault

Fig. 3: RIC 274. (from: Gorny & Mosch Giessener Münzhandlung, Auction 240 [10. October 2016], 421)

[8] See, among others, Crawford 1974: 744; Dillon 2007; Assenmaker 2007; Assenmaker 2008: 71. Rampado 2013: 1168–1169 (following Calandra di Roccolino 2008), inexactly dates it to 34 BC, for which there is no evidence.

[9] Already Michel (1967: 97–100; 134), made it quite clear that the star cannot be Alexander's star. See now exhaustively Pandey 2013.

of Alexander the Great on the town of the Mallians in the Indus valley, during which he and a few of his companions were trapped in the fortress. This was one of the episodes in the course of Alexander's Indian campaign, which began in 326 BC, and is preserved in Arrian's *Anabasis* (6.9–11; Wilkes 1969: n. 3 on pp. 51–52; Dzino 2010: 109). If Augustus, when writing his *Comentarii*, had been at all aware of it, he would have read about it in an earlier source, but it seems more likely that any similarities of both assaults should rather be regarded as coincidental or 'fabricated' *post festum*. The siege of Metulum was planned by Octavian's generals and had to be adapted to the geography and that particular fortress, as well as the available logistics.

It has further been suggested that the siege of Metulum might also be compared to Alexander's siege in 332 BC of Gaza, a stronghold controlling the main road from the Persian province of Syria to Egypt. During the siege, Alexander was seriously wounded and was only saved by the cuirass that he wore on that fateful day.[10] The fortress was defended by the commander of the garrison, the eunuch Batis, who ordered the Arabian mercenaries to sally forth and put the fire to the siege engines of the Macedonians. When the latter tried to put out fire, the enemy attacked them from the ramparts, causing panic among Alexander's soldiers. They fled, but Alexander with his bodyguards blocked their way and he was wounded by a missile from the catapult, which broke through his shield and cuirass, and hit his left shoulder; the cuirass probably saved his life. He accepted this as an omen, since it had been predicted to him that he would be successful in capturing the town, although on that day he would escape a great danger. Despite the serious wound, he again appeared in the front line, but soon almost collapsed because of bleeding. He had to be taken away, but came back again to join the siege and suffered another less dangerous wound in his leg, hit by a stone. Greatly angered, he did not retire from the siege, but continued fighting until the fortress surrendered. Batis, who was taken alive, behaved defiantly in front of Alexander, which made him furious. Inspired by the rage of his mythical ancestor Achilles, who dragged Hector's corpse in front of Troy, he had Batis fastened alive to his chariot and drove with him around the conquered town.

The comparison with this episode may also be viewed as far-fetched, but clearly Alexander, who had soon become a legendary hero and role model for all successful commanders and great leaders, fascinated Octavian as much as he had his predecessors and also Antony. In 30 BC, shortly after Cleopatra's suicide, Octavian even visited Alexander's tomb in Alexandria (Suet., *Aug.* 18.1; Kienast 1999 (2009): 74; 463; cf. 342) and temporarily exchanged Alexander's image for a sphinx on his seal. Suetonius mentions that Octavian, when signing documents and letters, first used a sphinx on his seal, and later a portrait of Alexander the Great, and eventually his own portrait, carved by Dioscurides; the last of these was adopted by his successors.[11] Later on, however, he was critical of Alexander for having shown no inclination for the dull daily duties of government (Malcovati 1969, *dicta* XVIII; Yavetz 1990: 34). However, *aemulatio* of a god or a hero, legendary or historical, was an inherent element of Graeco-Roman culture, and was continually used for various political purposes and self-promotion by the protagonists of the current political scene. This could be done more or less skilfully, causing agreement, but also contempt, envy, or ridicule; Octavian was always careful to avoid the latter. The fact that at the very beginning of his career Octavian allegedly compared himself to Achilles indicates how common such comparisons indeed were and how many different connotations they could have had. When he arrived in Rome after Caesar's assassination, and his mother and stepfather warned him from accepting Caesar's inheritance, he quoted to his mother the words Achilles had said to Thetis: "Then quickly let me die, since I was not destined to stand by my friend when he was killed" (*Il.* 18. 98–99). Octavian explained that these words of Achilles and what he did afterwards brought him immortal glory, and Caesar was not a friend but a father (App., *Bell. civ.* 3.2.13; Galinsky 2013: 30–32). However, it is not certain whether this scene had indeed taken place or was perhaps invented, and prompted by Augustus' later association with Alexander and his adulation of Achilles.

[10] Described by Arrian, *Anab*., 2.25.4–27.7 (who does not mention the death of Batis), and Q. Curtius Rufus, 4.6.7–29.

[11] *Aug*. 50.1: *In diplomatibus libellisque et epistulis signandis initio sphinge usus est, mox imagine Magni Alexandri, novissime sua, Dioscuridis manu scalpta, qua signare insecuti quoque principes perseverarunt.*

A NEW ERA OF PEACE? – OCTAVIAN'S TRIPLE TRIUMPH

Triumphs celebrated by Roman generals, often lasting more than one day, had always conveyed important messages and were a unique occasion for self-publicity, thus notably also the triumphs of Octavian's predecessors, Pompey and Caesar. These could have still been vividly remembered by eyewitnesses and must have been – in terms of the inevitable comparisons – of special significance for Octavian. Great rivals, Pompey and Caesar both strove to appear as victorious generals whose conquests made Rome the master of most of the *oecumene*. In 29 BC, when Octavian celebrated his three-day triumph, he had no rival and was at the zenith of his military career, in which his personal involvement was indisputable; significantly, he celebrated no other triumphs afterwards. He exploited it thoroughly to promote himself as a victorious general and the saviour of the Roman people; his predecessor was Romulus, and what is most significant in terms of the nascent Roman Empire, his triple triumph included Europe, Asia, and Africa. It was also described by Virgil in the context of the scenes on the shield of Aeneas, recounting future events and the glorious destiny of Rome (*Aen.* 8.714–731; Vella 2004); however, none of the peoples from Illyricum are mentioned.

Octavian celebrated no other triumph, because he wanted the triumphs of 29 BC to symbolize the victory of peace, internal and external; there was no mention of Antony and Cleopatra in any official documents (Gruen 1985; Balbuza 1999: 273 ff.; Assenmaker 2008: 59–61; Donati 2014), but it was made clear that his army fought for Italy and for the values and gods of their ancestors. The triumphs were celebrated on 13, 14, and 15 August of 29 BC, and commemorated his victories in Illyricum, at Actium, and in Egypt. As is known from Dio (49.38.1), Octavian declined the triumph that the senate had awarded him in 34 BC, after the first successful campaigns in Illyricum (Dio 49.38.1; cf. *Mon. Ancyr.* 4.1). He knew that his political position in Rome was still precarious at that time, because of the not yet resolved conflict with Antony. The first day of Octavian's triple triumph was intended to perpetuate Octavian's victories in Illyricum over the Iapodes, Pannonians, and Delmatae; the Illyrian War was a foreign war, in the course of which he had even risked his life. This was done for the safety of Italy. The festivities of the first day not only conveyed a most powerful message to the public, but also conveniently alleviated the ambiguities of the victory over Antony (Gurval 1995: 25–36).

A Roman triumph with splendid processions was a highly powerful means of publicity and self-promotion for a Roman army leader, with a great impact on the entire population of Rome at all social levels, including visitors who may have arrived in Rome only for the sake of such an event. Octavian was well aware of its persuasive force. How prestigiously he regarded the celebration of a triumph is not least indicated by the fact that a year afterwards, he obstructed the senatorial award of a triumph to the Macedonian proconsul M. Licinius Crassus for his spectacular victories in Moesia and Thrace and even denied him the honour of dedicating the *spolia opima* to Jupiter Feretrius (that is, spoils taken from the body of an enemy commander), for having personally killed the king of the Bastarnae, Deldo (Šašel Kos 2005: 502–505).

There is no doubt that Octavian regarded the Delmatae as one of the most formidable enemies in the war he fought in Illyricum. This is first of all clear from the official denomination; the triumph awarded by the Senate in 33 BC is called *de Dalma[t]is* in the *Fasti Barberini* (*Inscr. It.* 13/1, p. 345), *ex Illyrico* in Livy (*Per.* 133), *Delmaticum* in Suetonius (*Aug.* 22), and '*Illyrian*' in Appian (*Illyr.* 28.83: θρίαμβον Ἰλλυρικόν). In Servius it is noted as: *...triumphavit exercitus... qui Dalmatas vicerat...* (ad Verg., *Aen.* 8.714). Dio mentioned the triumph over the Pannonians, Delmatae, and Iapodes, as well as their neighbours (51.21.5). Moreover, the military standards won back from the Delmatae are mentioned in the *Res gestae* (*Mon. Ancyr.* 29.1): "*Having conquered the enemy, I recovered from Hispania, Gallia, and from the Dalmatae several military standards that had been lost by other generals*" (*Signa militaria complur[a per] alios d[u]ces am[issa] devicti[s ho]stibus re[cepi] ex Hispania et [Gallia et a Dalm]ateis* (καὶ παρὰ Δαλματῶν); the emphasis is on the Delmatae/Dalmatae, not on the province of Illyricum, which had obviously not been organized yet in the same way as Hispania and Gallia.

It is almost certain that none of the nine kings or royal children noted in the *Res Gestae* (4.3), who were led in the triumphal procession during Octavian's triple triumph, originated from Illyria (three have not been identified yet), since it seems impossible that an important fact like this would not have been mentioned by Appian. His narrative is too detailed and, moreover, taken from Augustus' *Commentarii*, in which captured leaders would no doubt figure prominently.

PORTICUS OCTAVIA

According to Appian (*Illyr.* 28.82), Octavian displayed the military standards recovered from the Dalmatae in the στοᾷ τῇ Ὀκταουία λεγομένῃ (*porticus Octavia*). Dio, however, did not refer at all to where Octavian actually had the *signa* placed, but noted that he had a portico constructed out of the spoils of war, which was called 'Octavian' in honour of his sister Octavia; libraries were also opened to the public in this portico (49.43.8). The portico was originally built by Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (Vell. Pat., 1.11.3–5; Pliny, *N. h.* 34.31; cf. Suet., *Aug.* 29.4) after his triumph over Macedonia in 146 BC (when he was granted the title *Macedonicus*), and reconstructed by Octavian and his sister (Olinder 1974: 92 ff.). Caecilius Metellus placed in it the famous work of art called the *Turma Alexandri*: 24 bronze equestrian statues made by Lysippos, representing the companions and generals of Alexander the Great and commemorating their death at the battle of the Granicus River in May 334 BC (on the battle: Nawotka 2010: 117–125). Velleius describes the portico and the exhibited monuments with suggestive words: "This is the Metellus Macedonicus who had previously built the portico about the two temples without inscriptions, which are now surrounded by the portico of Octavia, and who brought from Macedonia the group of equestrian statues which stand facing the temples, and, even at the present time, are the chief ornament of the place. Tradition hands down the following story of the origin of the group: that Alexander the Great prevailed upon Lysippus, a sculptor unexcelled in works of this sort, to make portrait-statues of the horsemen in his own squadron who had fallen at the river Granicus, and to place his own statue among them".[12] Metellus brought the statues as booty after his wars in Greece from the sanctuary of Zeus at Dium in Macedonia. Alexander's charisma inevitably fascinated all great generals, and so did the best Greek artists.

It has been believed that the *porticus Octavia* with the displayed legionary standards might also refer to the portico of Cn. Octavius, who had defeated the last Macedonian king Perseus in 168 BC (Olinder 1974: 92–93; Scheithauer 2000: 44; 272–273, n. 461). The idea that Octavian would have placed the re-conquered *signa* in the already existing portico of Cn. Octavius earlier seemed to me to be more plausible, and well in accordance with the extant data in Appian and Dio. Cn. Octavius had been the victor over the last Macedonian king, who was indeed the last successor of Alexander the Great in Macedonia (Šašel Kos 2005: 451). The confusion arose because both porticos were named 'Octavian' and both were situated near the Circus Flaminius. The portico of Cn. Octavius is mentioned by Pliny as a double portico built by Octavius after he had celebrated the naval triumph over Perseus (*NH* 34.23). Were Appian's and Dio's one and the same, or were they two different porticos (Coppola 1999: 206–209; Olinder 1974:, 124; Gurval 1995: 26–27)?

However, modern research has preferred the portico of Octavia, i.e. formerly that of Caecilius Metellus as the place where Octavian's *signa* were on display (Coppola 1999: 208–209; Bravi 2014: 150–152). And indeed, Caecilius Metellus had also fought in Macedonia against the usurper of the Macedonian throne, Andriscus, whom he deposed in 148 BC; the process of organizing Macedonia as a Roman province began under his authority. Octavia newly reconstructed the *Porticus Metelli* and consecrated it in her name and the name of her son Marcellus; this was no doubt carried out with Octavian's contribution, since this is claimed by Suetonius (*Aug.* 29.4), and Dio, too, explicitly stated that after the defeat of the Delmatae, Octavian had arcades and libraries newly built out of the booty (49.43.8; Richardson 1992: 317–318). The artworks were displayed in some of the *exedrae* and in two earlier sanctuaries, the first dedicated to Iuppiter Stator, the second to Iuno Regina, while in other *exedrae* there were libraries (*fig. 4*).

The *Turma Alexandri*, exhibited in the portico by Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, also corresponded well to Octavian's aspirations, by indirectly exalting his achievements in Illyricum, where at Metulum and Setovia he fought in the front line. Alexander reached the limits of the *oecumene*, both Pompey and Caesar compared themselves to the Macedonian conqueror (cf. Goldsworthy 2014: 207), and so did Octavian in his political goals. There was another aspect,

[12] Vell. Pat., 1.11.3–4: *Hic est Metellus Macedonicus, qui porticus, quae fuerunt circumdatae duabus aedibus sine inscriptione positis, quae nunc Octaviae porticibus ambiuntur, fecerat, quique hanc turmam statuarum equestrium, quae frontem aedium spectant, hodieque maximum ornamentum eius loci, ex Macedonia detulit. Cuius turmae hanc causam referunt Magnum Alexandrum impetrasse a Lysippo, singulari talium auctore operum, ut eorum equitum, qui ex ipsius turma apud Granicum flumen ceciderant, expressa similitudine figurarum faceret statuas et ipsius quoque iis interponeret*. Translated by F. W. Shipley in the Loeb Class. Library (first printed 1924).



Fig. 4: From Bravi 2014, p. 150.

other than military, involving Alexander the Great as inspiration for Octavian, which became increasingly significant. According to Pliny the Elder, a picture depicting Alexander, Philip, and Minerva, made by the painter Antiphilus from Naucratis, was also displayed in the portico of Octavia (*NH* 35.114: *(Antiphilus) ... pinxit et Alexandrum ac Philippum cum Minerva, qui sunt in schola in Octaviae porticibus [...]*). The son and the father under the wise guidance of Minerva: wisdom and dynastic continuity, symbolizing the new imperial era (Bravi 2014: 152).

ABBREVIATIONS

ANRW	*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Berlin-New York.
CIL	*Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin.
ILS	*Inscriptiones Latinae selectae*, ed. H. Dessau, Berlin 1892–1916.
RE	Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll-Mittelhaus-Ziegler, *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Stuttgart.
RIC	C. H. V. Sutherland, *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, Vol. I, revised edition: *31 BC–AD 69*, London 1984.

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OKTAVIJANOV ILIRSKI RAT: AMBICIJA I STRATEGIJA

Glavna dostignuća u Oktavijanovom Ilirskom ratu, koji je bio odlučujući za sustavno osvajanje Ilirika i detaljno opisan kod Apijana, u najvećoj mjeri bila su pad gradova Metula i Segeste/Siscije, kao i poraz Delmata i vraćanje legijskih znakovlja koja su bila oduzeta nakon poraza Aula Gabinija u vrijeme Cezara. Ono što je omogućilo postizanje ovih ciljeva bio je poraz Karna i Tauriska, što je otvorilo put ka Metulu i Segesti, potom zaplijeni liburnskog brodovlja u sjevernome Jadranu te uništenje pirata koji su imali svoja uporišta na Meliti i Crnoj Korkiri. Rimska prevlast na Jadranu osigurala je logistiku i prilaz unutrašnjosti te je tako omogućena potpora u kampanji protiv Delmata. Vježba vojnih postrojbi nije mogla biti glavni motiv za rat. Vojne su kampanje prekrivale široko područje, stoga se one ne mogu sagledavati samo kao vojni manevri bez strateški detaljnih planova.

U procesu postizanja prevlasti, Oktavijanu je Ilirski rat omogućio da se proglasi osloboditeljem Italije, posebice suprotstavljajući svoja djelovanja s onima Marka Antonija na Istoku, ali ponajviše kako bi stekao vojničku reputaciju koja je bila iznimno važna Cezarovom nasljedniku. U tijeku ovoga rata, izričito je isticao da je želio nastaviti Cezarov plan za napadanje Dačana. Kakogod, razmjeri osvojenih teritorija ne smiju biti preuveličani, što je bio slučaj s nekim naučnicima početkom 20. stoljeća, koji su pogrešno zaključili da je Oktavijan osvojio veći dio teritorija današnje Bosne i Hercegovine.

Očito je da nekoliko moćnih panonskih naroda uopće nisu bili napadnuti tada. Kako je vrlo jasno iz usporedbe nekoliko izvora, a posebno od Apijana, rezultati Ilirskog rata bili su osvajanje Japoda, panonskog teritorija do Siscije, Delmata i većine obalnog područja s ponešto unutrašnjosti. Za tadašnju političku i vojnu situaciju, Oktavijanu je bilo od velikog značaja inzistirati da je Cezarov nasljednik; kasnije, Cezarov je lik bio od manjeg značaja. Ovo je djelomično povezano s činjenicom da je August izgradio svoj autoritet pomalo ali ustrajno, unutar okvira Republike koju je obnovio, a koja je bila nekompatibilna s Cezarovim nastojanjima i djelovanjem.

Dok je Antonije prisvojio Aleksandrov lik istočnjačkog despota, Oktavijan je oponašao Aleksandrovu hrabrost na bojnome polju, pa čak i više, kako bi ostvario svoj veliki projekt da postane gospodarom ekumene (*oecumene*), kao i Cezar. Oktavijan je dao iskovati denarij, vjerojatno u Brundiziju između 29. i 27. god. pr. Krista, koji prikazuje glavu Marsa i siglu IMP na licu, dok je na naličju bio prikazan štit sa zvijezdom (s osam zraka i krugom u sredini) koja je položena na ukrštenima koplju i maču. Kronologija ovog novca *(Imp(erator) Caesar i Caesar Divi f(ilius))* nije posve jasna, a možda su bili kovani za isplatu vojnicima koji su služili u vrijeme kampanje kod Akcija, ili čak i ranije, nakon bitke kod Nauloha. Predloženo je da zvijezda predstavlja makedonsku zvijezdu; u tom bi slučaju taj novac ne samo rasvijetlio Oktavijanovu ambiciju kao Cezarov nasljednik, vrijedan svoje reputacije, već bi aludirao i na Aleksandra Velikog. Kako bilo, zvijezda ne može biti ništa drugo nego *sidus Iulium*, koja simbolizira deifikaciju Julija Cezara, a time i naglašava Oktavijanovo božansko podrijetlo.

Godine 29. pr. Krista, kada je Oktavijan slavio svoj trodnevni trijumf, on nije imao suparnika i to je bio vrhunac njegove vojničke karijere, u kojem je njegov osobni angažman bio neosporan; znakovito, nakon ovoga nije više proslavljao trijumfe. To je spretno iskorištavao kako bi promicao sebe kao pobjedničkog generala i spasitelja rimskog naroda; njegov je prethodnik bio Romul, a što je najznačajnije za Rimsko Carstvo u nastajanju, njegov je trostruki trijumf uključio Europu, Aziju i Afriku. Oktavijan je želio da trijumf 29. god. pr. Kr. simbolizira pobjedu mira, unutrašnjeg i vanjskog; u službenim dokumentima nije bilo spomena o Antoniju i Kleopatri, ali bilo je jasno to da se njegova vojska borila za Italiju i za vrijednosti i dobra njihovih predaka.

Ključne riječi: Oktavijan/August, Ilirik, *imitatio* Cezara i Aleksandra Velikog